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SOME PROBLEMS CONFRONTING THE PUBLIC
WORKS EMERGENCY HOUSING
CORPORATION
HAROLD" ROBINSONt

Once again as the result of an emergency-this time a widespread
economic depression-the Federal government has ventured into the
field of housing construction.1 In the war years of 1918-1920 the
United States carried on construction of housing on a wide scale
through incorporated agencies, the United States Housing Corporation and the United States Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corporation. Problems inherent in such an entrance of government into
a, theretofore, field of private enterprise were either not raised or
were brushed aside as permissible and necessary appurtenants of the
war powers of Congress and the President. The Emeigency Rent
Laws,' it is true, evoked a furore of both protest and approbation, but
that outburst against governmental control was due to the imposition
of restrictions on private property and not to any objection to governmental competition. A finding that the social emergency temporarily affected housing with a public interest proved to be the solution to the difficulty. The problems of taxation, of immunity from suit,
and other attempts to deny the interchangeability of these and similar
federal corporations with the personality of the United States later
were the subject-matter of litigation. But the concomitant problems
of compliance with building restrictions, of eminent domain, of jurisdiction, civil and political, of voting and school privileges, of police
and fire protection, and similar issues never reached the courts.
War hysteria levels most objections. These and other difficulties
tAttorney to Housing Division, Federal Emergency Administration of Public
Works. The author is indebted to Miss Sophie Robinson of The Yale Law'
School for her assistance.

'The pertinent part of the National Industrial Recovery Act reads as follows:
"The Administrator, under the direction of the President, shall prepare a
comprehensive program of public works, which shall include among other
things the following:

(d) construction, reconstruction, . alteration or repair

under public regulation or control of low cost housing and slum clearance
projects;" NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL REcovERY AcT, tit. II, § 202; Circular No.
i entitled "The Purposes, Policies, Functioning and Organization of the Emergency Administration." (The Rules Prescribed by the President).
'See a note by the author in (1930) 40 YALE L. J. 820 entitled "Delays in
Eviction Actions As a Means of Unemployment Relief."
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confront the peace time activities of the present housing program, and
in particular, the Public Works Emergency Housing Corporation!
PUBLIC PURPOSE

Incorporated into the Emergency Relief and Construction Act of
1932 and the National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933 as an incentive
to and relief of the building trades, the housing program is intended
to be a model for private, state and municipal construction of low
cost housing.' The existence of the Housing Corporation and of
the housing program itself is, of course, predicated upon the construction of housing by government being a proper governmental
activity. The recent case of Blaisdell v. Home Loan and Building
Association5 minimizes to a large degree the possibility that housing
may be held not to be a valid government function, as an unemploy'The Public Works Emergency Housing Corporation (hereinafter called the
Housing Corporation) was incorporated under the laws of the State of Delawvare to "act as an agency of the United States of America" to construct, reconstruct, alter or repair, or to aid financially or otherwise in the...., of low
cost housing and slum clearance projects." The incorporators were Sec. of
Interior Ickes, Sec. of Labor Perkins and Robert D. Kohn, Director of Housing. The stock is held in trust for the United States. By an Executive Order
of Nov. 29, 1933 the President designated the Housing Corporation an
"agency" under the power bestowed upon him by Title II of the National Industrial Recovery Act authorizing the President to "establish such agencies"
as were necessary to effectuate the purpose of the act.
The question of whether "establish such agencies" permits the incorporation
of a corporation will not be discussed here. The war time acts authorized the
organization of corporations. However, the Sugar Equalization Board, Inc.,
and U. S. Grain Corporation were formed pursuant to an act merely
authorizing the President to "use any agency" for the purpose of the Food and
Fuel Act. Fed. Sugar Co. v. U. S. S. E. Board, 268 Fed. 575 (S. D. N. Y.
192O) ; 4o STAT. 276 (1917).
The issues arising between the Housing Corporation and the Comptroller
General, and the question of the necessity of compliance with governmental
rules and regulations are not discussed in this article.
'Examples of the current attitude are addresses by Fred F. French, builder
of the Knickerbocker Village project: SLUM CLEARANCE IN NEW YORK &
SLUM CLEARANCE & KNICKERBOCKER VILLAGE (1933);
ABROAD (933);
Mayer, Housing: A Call to Action, (April 18, 1934) NATION.
'29o U. S. 398, 54 Sup. Ct 231 (934).
In an address before the New York State Bar Association, Dean Charles E.
Clark of the Yale Law School predicted that the Supreme Court would uphold
the constitutionality of "a considerable part, at least" of the present emergency
acts. "Individualism & the Constitution," N. Y. TIMES, Jan. 27, 1934. See also,
Clark, A Socialistic State under The Constitution, FORTUNE (February issue,
1934).
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ment curative in times of economic stress. There is, however, a firmer
basis for government construction than the existence of an economic
emergency.
Aside from its emergency features, housing has been clothed with a
public interest by changing social and economic conditions. Regulation of privately owned dwellings has been upheld repeatedly as a
health and safety measure.' Zoning has even been permitted for
what in reality are aesthetic reasons.' The desirability and need for
slum clearance and low cost housing with their corresponding health
benefits militate in favor of a similar conclusion, that the construction
of housing by government is a devotion of public funds to a public
use.
Not only must housing bear the halo of public interest; it must
also be a proper function within the powers granted by the Constitution. The latter will be assumed for the purposes of this discussion.
The arguments as to what if any clause or clauses of the United
States Constitution permit government construction of housing are
too well known and invite too lengthy discussion to dare repetition.
It may merely be pointed out that the Credit clause, the Interstate
Commerce clause and the much maligned General Welfare clause of
the United States Constitution have all been suggested as the constitutional authorization for this and other present day federal activities. It may be, too, that, under present conditions and the
trend toward federal paternalism and subsidization, the mere existence of a public interest will be deemed sufficient authority.
No cases have directly raised the issue of the legality of construction of housing by the federal government. Only a few decisions have
directly answered the question of state construction and operation of
housing. Two, Opinion of Justices* and Green v. Frazier,' are
representative of the divergent poles of social thought.
In 1912 the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts considered
a statute providing for state purchase of land and construction
of buildings, to "rent, manage, sell and fepurchase" to provide homes
'Tenement House Dept. v. Moeschen, 179 N. Y. 325, 72 N. E. 231 (1904),
aff'd 203 U. S. 593, 27 Sup. Ct. 781 (.I9O6) ; (19o6) 7o L. R. A. 704.
'Welsh v. Swazey, 193 Mass. 364, 79 N. E. 745 (I9O7), aff'd 214 U. S. 91,
29 Sup. Ct. 67 (19o9). Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U. S. 183, 48 Sup.
Ct. 477 (1928). Baker, Aesthetic Zoning Regulations (1926) 25 MicH. L. REV.
124.

8211 Mass. 624, 98 N. E. 611 (1912) ; cf. Libby v. Portland, 105 Me. 370, 74
Atl. 8o5 (1909), 26 L. R. A. (N.S.) 141 (1910).
'44 N. D. 395, 176 N. W. 11 (1920), affirmed 253 U. S. 233, 40 Sup. Ct. 499
(192o).
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for "mechanics, laborers or other wage earners" for the sake of improving the "public health by providing houses in the more thinly
populated area of the state for those who might otherwise live in the
most congested areas of the state." The plan was not one of pauper
relief nor even essentially one of low cost housing. In an opinion,
interesting for its contrast to the decision and language of the United
States Supreme Court in Blaisdell v. Minnesota and particularly to
the general trend of national affairs today, the court said:
"The dominating design of a statute requiring the use of public funds must be the promotion of public interests and not the
furtherance of the advantage of individuals. However beneficial
in a general or popular sense it may be that private interests
should prosper and thus incidentally serve the public, the expenditure of public money to this end is not justified."
"It is a matter of common knowledge that thousands of inhabitants of the commonwealth who are mechanics, laborers or
other wage earners have become, through industry, temperance
and frugality, owners of the homes in which they dwell. These
proprietors, however humble may be their houses, cannot be
taxed for the purpose of enabling the state to aid others in acquiring a home whose temperment, environment or habits have
heretofore prevented them from attaining a like position."
"It may be urged that the measure is aimed at mitigating the
evils of overcrowded tenements and unhealthy slums. These evils
are a proper subject for the exercise of the police power.
Through the enactment of building ordinances, regulations and
inspection as to housing and provision for light and air lies
a broad field for the suppression of mischiefs of this kind.""°
And, as the court quoted from the case of Lowell v. Boston,' involving the power of the City of Boston to raise funds by the sale
of bonds in order to loan money to owners of real estate whose buildings had been destroyed in the Boston fire:
"The promotion of the interest of individuals, either in respect of property or business, although it may result incidentally
in the advancement of the public welfare, is, in its essential character, a private and not a public object

.

.

.

However certain

tain and great the resulting good to the general public, it does
not, by reason of its comparative importance, cease to be incidental. The incidental advantage to the public or to the state,
which results from the promotion of private interests, and the
prosperity of private enterprises or business, does not justify
their aid by the use of public money raised by taxation, or for
which taxation may become necessary. It is the essential charaSupra note 8, at 625, 629, N. E. at 612, 6:14.

niii Mass. 454, 15 Am. Rep. 39 (873).
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acter of the direct object of the expenditure which must determine
its validity, as justifying a tax, and not the magnitude of the
interests to be affected, nor the degree to which the general advantage of the community and thus the public welfare may be
ultimately benefited by their promotion."'
In Green v. Frazier a similar statute involving similar considerations was attacked. That statute was designed to foster home building and home ownership through state construction and resale and
thereby end itinerant family life. The Supreme Court of North
Dakota upheld the statute as a valid governmental enterprise. On
appeal, tbe Supreme Court of the United States avoided a direct expression of opinion on housing being so affected with a public interest
as to permit construction by a municipal body, by saying:
"The taxing power of the states is primarily vested in the
Legislatures, deriving their authority from the people. When a
state Legislature acts within the scope of its authority, it is responsible to the people, and their right to change the agents to
whom they have intrusted the power is ordinarily deemed a
sufficient check upon its abuse. When the constituted authority
of the State undertakes to exert the taxing power, and the question of the validity of its action is brought before this Court,
every presumption in its favor is indulged, and only clear and
demonstrated usurpation of power will authorize judicial interference with legislative action. . .
In the present instance
under the authority of the Constitution and laws prevailing in
North Dakota the people, the Legislature, and the highest court
of the state have declared the purpose for which these
several acts were passed to be of a public nature, and within
the taxing authority of the state.

.

.

. With this united action

of people, Legislature and court, we are not at liberty to interfere unless it is clear beyond reasonable controversy that rights
secured by the federal Constitution have been violated. .
Under the peculiar conditions existing in North Dakota, which
are emphasized in the opinion of its highest court, if the state sees
fit to enter upon such enterprises as are here involved, with the
sanction of its Constitution, its Legislature and its people, we are
not prepared to say that it is within the authority of this court,
in enforcing the observance of the Fourteenth Amendment, to
set aside such action by judicial decision.""
But, by including the suggestion:
"unless it is clear beyond a reasonable controversy",
the court left room for the distinction of other similar legislation. It
must be conceded, too, that the declaration by a court that a legislative
'Id. at 461; supra note IO,at 626, N. E. at 612.
'3Sutpra note 9 at 239, Sup. Ct. at 501.
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expression is conclusive means little. A finding of abuse of discretion
(as in the case of lower courts or administrative officers) or of lack of
sufficient facts to sustain the expression may always be found.
Possibly the eight years interval between the decisions accounts for
the variation in holdings of the courts of Massachusetts and North
Dakota?' More probably it was the influence of the Non-Partisan
Leaue and the temper of the people of North Dakota.
More recently the issue of housing construction arose in California.
The municipal charter of the City of Los Angeles authorized the
establishment of a Municipal Housing Commission empowered to:
"Provide by purchase, lease, condemnation, construction or
otherwise, and to improve, rent, manage, sell and repurchase
lands, dwellings, apartment houses, lodging houses or tenement
houses, for the purpose of improving the health, safety and welfare of the inhabitants of said city, by providing homes for those
who might otherwise live in over-crowded tenements, unhealthy
slums, or the most congested areas."'"
This act was regarded by the court as a health measure designed
to preserve the health of the inhabitants by warding off epidemics,
and therefore constituting a public use of publik funds. That private
persons were thereby benefited was regarded as immaterial, the court
disagreeing with the Massachusetts Court, saying:
"The fact that in the course of administration of the affairs of
the commission private persons will receive benefit, as tenants or
otherwise, of houses constructed by the commission, is not sufficient to take away from the enterprise the characteristics of a public purpose.""
As precedent the court had the somewhat inconsistent decision of
Veterans' Welfare Board v. Jordan," holding invalid the sale of state
bonds for the purpose of securing funds to purchase farms or homes,
selected by the veterans, to be turned over to them on long term
credits, as a violation of the Constituted provisions prohibiting the
loan of the credit. of the state. But the application of the funds to
buying large tracts of land to be improved and subdivided and turned
"'As one famous jurist has said: "The life of an idea is twenty years".
In I95 the Massachusetts Constitution was amended to authorize the State
to construct houses for the purpose of "relieving congestion and providing
homes for citizens" to be sold at cost. In 1917 the Constitution was again
amended, terming the providing of shelter during an emergency a public function.
'Willmon v. Powell, 9i Cal. App. I, 4, 266 Pac. io29, io3o (i93i).
11Id. at 7, Pac. at 1032.
'718g Cal. 124, 208 Pac. 284 (1922), 22 A. L. R. 1515 (1923).
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over to the veterans on long term credits was upheld as part of a
policy of land settlement and as subserving a public purpose.
In a recent New Jersey case the question of whether a municipality
may indulge in housing operation was raised but the issue was sidestepped as not necessary to the decision.' Previously the same court
had said of housing in an opinion involving the use of city funds to
defend eviction suits:
"Housing can only be provided where in the ordinary commercial way or by private charity.""
The issue arose in a different way in Florida in the case of Hoskins v. City of Orlando.Y There apparently the city attempted to
lease an apartment house to be operated for investment purposes. In
denying the propriety of such a transaction, the Court, nevertheless,
permits an inference by saying:
"An apartment house in operation is so remote from the purpose of municipal government that the purchase of an interest in
it is not presumptively valid, but apparently invalid, and the
declaration should have alleged, if it could be done, some proper
municipal use intended for it. '' 1
The federal government does not meet with the objection of express constitutional provisions prohibiting the loan of government
credit. The sole issue is that of government's place in housing. As
already indicated, the construction of housing may be upheld as an
emergency measure. For that matter the elimination of congested
areas and the effectuation of healthful conditions may be said to constitute a perpetual emergency. The Supreme Court has said that the
expression by a legislature that a purpose is public will be conclusive. Whether this will be extended to an expression by the federal
legislature is still undecided.
EMINENT DOMAIN

The first step in housing construction will necessarily be the acquisition of land. It is hoped (but with the ever present scepticism) that
public opinion will exert sufficient pressure to insure little or no
'Simon v. O'Toole, io8 N. J.L. 32, 155 Atl. 449 (13i). A city ordinance
empowering the use of city funds to purchase land and develop a park in
connection with a private housing venture was upheld under the theory that the
funds were for park purposes and not for housing purposes.
"Stell v. Jersey City, 95 N. J. L. 38, iir At. 274 (192o) ; cf. Koch v. Board
of Commissioners, 97 N. J.L. 61, 116 Atl. 328 (N. J.Sup. Ct. ,1922) ; Braunstein v. Jersey City, 98 N. J. L. 478, 12o Atl. ig (1923).

'51 F. (2d) goi (C. C. A. 5th, 1931).

"Id. at 9o4.
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gouging by landowners.'
The possibility that condemnation will
be unnecessary, however, is remote. The United States Supreme
Court has held that a taxpayer may not question the power of Congress to appropriate money for any purpose, in a proceeding instituted for the purpose of questioning that power.' But in condemnation proceedings by the United States one whose property is
sought for housing purposes may raise the issues of public use and
of the general power of the United States to exercise the power of
eminent domain. The first problem, that of public purpose, has been
discussed; the second is so well settled that the question has resolved
itself mainly into a question of the most expeditious and most practical proceeding to be followed.
The right of the United States to exercise the power of eminent domain is well established. Lands may be acquired within a state by
the United States by eminent domain or otherwise without the consent of the State. As the Court said in Kohl v. United States,' a case
involving the acquisition of a post office site,
"If the right to acquire property for such uses may be made a
barren right by the unwillingness of property-holders to sell, or
by the action of a state prohibiting a sale to the Federal Government, the constitutional grants of power may be rendered nugatory, and the government is dependent for its practical existence
upon the will of a State, or even upon that of a private citizen.
This cannot be. No one doubts the existence in the State government of the right of eminent domain,-a right distinct from and
paramount to the right of ultimate ownership."'
Or as later reiterated in United States v. Gettysburg Electric Railway' wherein the power of the Federal Government to condemn
lands for a national park was questioned:
"It is, of course, not necessary that the power of condemnation
for such purpose be expressly given by the Constitution. The
right to condemn at all is not so given, it results from the powers
=The Honorable Harold L. Ickes, Public Works Administrator, has been
quoted as saying: "No one is going to swindle the government by charging
extortionate prices for land. We will pay fair prices-no more. If the landowners' try to hold us up, you might remind them that under the National
Recovery Act we have the power of eminent domain and we will condemn the
land and take it if we are forced to do so. What is more, we mean business
about it." COLLxa'S MAGAZINE, February 3, 1934.
'Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U. S. 447, 43 Sup. Ct. 597 (1923).
2191 U. S. 367, 23 L. ed. 499 (875).
=Id. at 371.
Oi6o U. S. 668, i6 Sup. Ct. 427 (1896).
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that are given, and it is implied because of its necessity, or because it is appropriate in exercising those powers."'
The power of the Federal Government is not confined to the exercise of eminent domain itself, but includes the right to delegate that
power to corporations organized for the purpose of carrying out some
public purpose within the scope of Federal control. The power has
been delegated to private corporations organized for profit and at the
same time intended as a means for carrying out a public purpose.'
In the case of the Housing Corporation, a corporation organized for
Federal purposes and financed with Federal funds, there is no doubt
of the power of Congress to delegate the power of eminent domain
to the Corporation, assuming, of course, that the first premise of the
validity of the Housing program itself is sustained.
The Housing Corporation may find it desirable to have the State
or municipality condemn the land and transfer it to the Housing
Corporation. In Kohl v. United States, Justice Strong explicitly approved the holding in People v. Humphrey' that the State of Michigan may not condemn land for the use of the federal government.
In People v. Humphrey, the Court said:
"In the first place there can be no necessity for the exercise of
this right by the State for this purpose, for the authority of the
nation is ample for the supply of its own needs in this regard under all circumstances. In the second place, the eminent domain
in any sovereignty exists only for its own purposes; and to furnish machinery to the general government under, and by means
of which, it is to appropriate lands for national objects is not
among, ,the evils contemplated in the creation of the State government. 30
A point of distinction raised in decisions in other jurisdictions is
the Court's further statement that:
"It (the Michigan statute) assumes that the taking is to be for
the United States exclusively. It is not necessary for us to consider, therefore, what might be the result were the theory of the
act different."'
A Pennsylvania court reached a conclusion similar to that of
People v. Humphrey in eminent domain proceedings by the United
1id. at 681, Sup. Ct. at 429.
'Luxton v. North River Bridge Co., 153 U. S. 525, 14 Sup. Ct. 89, (1894);
I

WILLOUGHBY,
123

CONSTITUTION OF THE UNImD

Mich. 471 (1871).

'*Id. at 476.

-'Id.at 478.

STATES (2d ed. 1929)

i8o.
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States under state laws of a site for a post office.
concluded:

That Court too

"The primary object is the accommodation of the United States
government, and the convenience and comfort of its officials.
The citizens of this State have no right in said buildings not
common to all other citizens of the United States, nor have they
any control over them."'
Other jurisdictions have upheld the power of the State to condemn
land for federal purposes on the theory that the State as well as the
federal government derives a benefit. Thus condemnation of land for
a canal to be built by the state and transferred to the United States,'
and of a harbor by a municipality,' have been sustained on similar
grounds. Recent decisions in Virginia,' North Carolina and
Tennessee" have permitted the condemnation of lands, for inclusion
in a national park, on the same basis of benefit to the state, despite
the fact that control was shifted to the federal government. Condemnation of land for a fort by the United States under state authorization has been permitted on the reasoning that the transfer of the
land to the federal government secured the attainment of a state interest, defense of its soil." If the conclusion to be drawn is that
condemnation resulting in benefit to the state as well as to the federal
government will be upheld, condemnation for housing purposes should
be permissible. For that matter, anything beneficial to the federal
government benefits its integral parts.
There is another possible method of proceeding (and the one most
likely to be employed) : the exercise of the power of eminent domain
by the Administrator in the name of the United States and a transfer of title to the Housing Corporation. Condemnation might be
secured under the Act of 1888' and the supplementary Act of 1931'
'Darlington v. United States, 82 Pa. 382, 384 (1878). In connection with
the reverse problem, the power of the United States to condemn for state purposes, it must be roted that the Supreme Court once said: "It is undoubtedly
true that the power of appropriating private property to public uses vested in
the general government... cannot be transferred to a State." Jones v. United
States, 109 U. S. 513, 518, 3 Sup. Ct. 346, 350 (1883).
"Lancey v. King, -15 Wash. 9 (1896).

'State v. Milwaukee, 156 Wis. 549, 146 N. W. 775 (1914).
"Rudacille v. State, 155 Va. 8o8, 165 S.E. 829 (1931).
'Yarborough v. Park Commission, 196 N. C. 284, 145 S.E. 563 (1928).
'State v. Oliver, 162 Tenn. 100, 35 S. W. (2d) 396 (193).

'Gilmer v. Lime Point, i8 Cal. 229 (i86i).
357 (888), 40 U. S. C. §§ 257, 258 (1926).
'46 STAT. 1421 (I93I), 40 U. S.C.SuPP. I.§ 258a (933).

"'25 STAT.
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entitled "An Act to expedite the construction of Public Works'
Buildings outside of the District "of Columbia by enabling possession
and title to sites to be taken in advance of final judgment in proceedings for the acquisition thereof under the power of eminent domain."
The Emergency Relief and Construction Act of 1932, ' also a form
of summary proceedings, set up additional special machinery to acquire land by condemnation for the emergency construction of public building projects. Section 203 (a) of the National Industrial
Recovery Act' piovides for the application of the condemnation proceedings of the Emergency Relief and Construction Act of 1932 to
the acquisition of any land or site in the construction of buildings
provided for in Title II. Under Section 203 (a) "The President is
authorized and empowered, through the Administrator or through
such other agencies as he may designate or create, to acquire by purchase, or by exercise of the power of eminent domain, any real or
personal property in connection with the construction of any such
project, to sell any security acquired or property so constructed or
acquired or to lease any such property with or without the privilege
of purchasing it."
As already indicated, the exercise of eminent domain by the Federal Government cannot be seriously questioned. There is little
doubt of the right of such exercise of eminent domain by the Hous,ing Corporation. A number of procedural difficulties not here discussed are inevitable. The time element being important, the choice
of the quickest procedure may be expected.
EXEMPTION OF THE HOUSING CORPORATION FROM

STATE AND

LOCAL BUILDING REGULATIONS

In many localities the building codes are so antiquated and obsolete
as to make the construction of certain types of buildings impossible
or the cost prohibitive. It is common knowledge that in many instances bribery is the only practical solution. It may be necessary
therefore for the Housing Administration to choose between the
alternatives of not erecting housing in certain localities, of inducing
a change in the building restrictions, or of asserting a freedom from
building regulations under an extension of the doctrine of McCulloch
v. Maryland. The first alternative is dependent upon the feasibility
'47 STAT. 722 (1932), 40 U. S. C. SupP. I. § 258a note (1933).
"48 STAT. 201 (1933), 40 U. S. C. SuPP. I. § 401 (1933). A new condemnation bill providing for uniform procedure was recently passed in the United
States Senate.
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of either of the last two; the second upon the frame of mind of the'
local legislators.
Exemption from building regulations may be claimed on the
ground that the Housing Corporation is a federal instrumentality with
whose functions a state may not interfere. Several Supreme Court
decisions appear to sanction the belief that the Housing Corporation
is independent of local building regulations. As early as 1885 the
Supreme Court announced:
"Where, therefore, lands are acquired in any other way by the
United States within the limits of a State than by purchase with
her consent, they will hold the lands subject to this qualification:
that if upon them forts, arsenals, or other public buildings, with
their appurtenances, as instrumentalities for the execution of its
powers, will be free from any such interference and jurisdiction
of the State as would destroy or impair their effective use for-the
purpose designed. Such is the law with reference to all instrumentalities created by the general government. Their exemption from State control is essential to independence and sovereign
authority of the United States within the sphere of their delegated
powers."'

The immunity of government employees from forms of police regulation in the fulfillment of government business has already been
passed upon. In Johnson v. Maryland" the United States Supreme
Court held that the State of Maryland could not require mail drivers
to secure driver's licenses, on the theory that no state may interfere
with the Federal Government or its instrumentalities in the performance of government functions. The Court said:
"It seems to us that the immunity of the instruments of the
United States from state control in the performance of their duties extends to a requirement that they desist from performance
until they satisfy a state officer upon examination that they are
competent for a necessary part of them and pay a fee for permission to go on. Such a requirement does not merely touch the
Government servants remotely by a general rule of conduct; it
lays hold of them in their specific attempt to obey orders and requires qualifications in addition to those that the Government has
pronounced sufficient.""
'See Fort Leavenworth v. Lowe, 114 U. S. 525, 539, 5 Sup. Ct. 995, 1002
(1885).

"254 U. S. 51, 41 Sup. Ct. 6 (I92o) ; cf. R. I. v. Burton, 41 R. I. 303, 103
AtI. 962 (igi8), L. R. A. 1918 F. 559 (dispatch driver arrested for speeding) ;
Re Neagle, 135 U. S. I, io Sup. Ct. 658 (1889) (federal marshal not subject
to trial in state courts for killing committed in course of duties).
"Id. at 57, Sup. Ct. at 16.

56o
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Attempts have been made to distinguish this holding on the
grounds that (i) the basis for state regulation being the degree of
reasonable interference, only unreasonable regulation is prohibited,
and (2) the statement of the Court that:
"It may very well be that when the United States. has not
spoken the subjection to local law would extend to general rules
that might affect incidentally the mode of carrying out the employment -, as for instance, a statute or ordinance regulating
the mode of turning at corners of streets..."'
citing Comm. v. Closson,' which subjected mail drivers to traffic
regulations regarding the turning at intersections. A Virginia Court
insisted that mail drivers are subject to speed laws, differentiating
Johnson v. Maryland on the theory that:
"So far as appears from the record before us, the United
States has not spoken on the subject of the speed at which it was
the duty of the accused to travel in such way as to make the Virginia statute in .question in any way interfere with the performance of the Federal duties of the accused.""
That is to say, there was no conflict between federal and state laws
such as to necessitate a subordination of state laws to the power of
the federal authoities. A subsequent case in a federal district court,
involving application of a municipal ordinance to the driver of an
improperly lighted mail truck, laid similar stress on the fact that rules
of conduct had been prescribed by the drivers' superiors." On this
theory, too, one might distinguish Ohio v. Thomas,' holding that
state pure food laws did not apply to the governor of a National
Soldiers' Home, Congress having indirectly made provision in its
appropriations for the purchase of oleomargarine. The language of
that court, however, is strikingly definite:
"The government is but claiming that its own officers, when
discharging duties under Federal authority pursuant and by virtue of valid federal laws, are not subject to arrest or other liability under the laws of the State in which their duties are performed."'
4eId. at 56, Sup. Ct. at 16.

"'229 Mass. 329, 118 N. E. 653 (I918).
"Hall v. Comm., 129 Va. 738, l05 S. E. 55I

(921);

Wash. 387, 199 Pac. 749 (igzI), 18 A. L. R. 1163 (I92I).
"Ex parte Willman, 277 Fed. 81 (S. D. Ohio 1921).
50173 U. S. 276, 19 Sup. Ct. 453 (1899).

111d. at 283, Sup. Ct. at 455.

State v. Wiles,
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Again, in United States v. Hunt,2 state hunting laws, i. e. police
regulations, were not permitted to interfere with the authority of the
United States over preserves in a National forest. Here, too, the
United States had spoken through the medium of the Secretary of
the Interior. Possibly this decision could be shown inapplicable as
falling within Article IV Sec. 3 (2) of the United States Constitution,
but no mention was made of this section by the Supreme Court although it was cited by the lower court whose opinion was affirmed.
If the distinguishing factor, however, is the existence of federal regulations, the Executive Order of the President and regulations of the
Secretary should be sufficient to bring the Housing Corporation
within the purview of the above cases.
A case particularly in point is Arizona v. California.' There the
Supreme Court held that the plans and specifications of Boulder
Dam need not be submitted to the approval of the state engineer of
Arizona, despite a state statute requiring such submission for approval. The court ruled:
"The United States may perform its functions without conforming to the police regulations of a state. If Congress has
power to authorize the construction of the dam and reservoir,
Wilbur is under no obligation to submit the plans and specifications to the State Engineer's approval.""
The power to construct the dam was based upon the power of Congress over navigable waters. That power does not differ from a
power to construct housing. The former power is express, the latter
implied; but if, as the court in Arizonz v. California suggested, the
power exists, freedom from regulation in the one should also mean
freedom from regulation in the other. Nor did the court appear to
base its decision on the ground of concurrent or exclusive jurisdiction.
For its holding it cited Johnson v. Maryland and Hunt v. United
States.
Despite the distinctions that may be, and have been, raised, the
decisions upholding the superiority of the United States appear based
on the sole idea that the United States may perform its functions
without conforming to the police regulations of a state. There is
little difference between the basic idea of drivers' licenses, oleomargarine laws, hunting laws and dam supervision and building regulations. All are predicated upon the need for police protection and
safety of the community. And yet the Supreme Court in each case
r2278 U. S. 96, 49 Sup. Ct. 39 (1929).
"283 U. S. 423, 5I Sup. Ct. 522 (1931).

"Id. at 451, Sup. Ct. at 525.
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denied the power of regulation to the state. The attitude of the Court
is well exemplified by the statement made by Justice Brandeis, in referring to Johnson v. Maryland, that:
"this court held that the power of Congress to establish post roads
precluded the state from requiring of a post office employee using
the state highway in the transportation of mail the customary
evidence of competency to drive a motortruck, although the danger to public safety was obvious and it did not appear that the
federal government had undertaken to deal with the matter by
statute or regulation. The prohibition of state action rests, as
the court pointed out there, 'not upon any consideration of degree, but upon the entire absence of power on the part of the
states to touch the instrumentalities of the United States.' "'
TAXATION-PROPERTY AND FRANCHISE AND CORRESPONDING
PRIVILEGES
Inevitably the Housing Administration will encounter the problem of state and local tax assessment. From the financial viewpoint
of the Housing Administration, the burden of property, franchise and
special assessments is undesirable. Despite the fact that corresponding benefits are received and that as a matter of policy the good
will of the community is desirable, the claim of tax exemption may
be raised on the ground that property of the United States and of its
instrumentalities is not subject to taxation.
The power of a state or political subdivision to tax property of the
United States or of its instrumentalities has been discussed too much
elsewhere to warrant further extensive analysis. The multitude of
cases originating with McCulloch v. Maryland, and based upon the
principle of federal supremacy and the idea of the power to tax being
the power to destroy are too common knowledge to necessitate repetition. But some reference should be made to the series of cases, arising in the last decade, involving the taxability of federal corporationsfederal, in that they were organized for purposes of the federal
government-incorporated under state laws and similar in many respects to the Housing Corporation in their reason for being and in
their corporate structure. These expressions of judicial opinion are
indicative of the decision most likely to be reached in any future
litigation.'
'Gilbert v. Minnesota, 254 U. S. 325, 341, 41 Sup. Ct. 125, 13o (1920) ; see
Fox Film v. Doyal, 286 U. S. 123, 128, 52 Sup. Ct. 546, 547 (1932) (resting
upon an "entire absence of power").
'In view of such decisions as Fox Film Corporation v. Doyal, supra note
55, Jaybird Mining Co. v. Weir, 271 U. S. 6o9, 46 Sup. Ct. 592 (1926) (Brandeis' dissent), and Burnet v. Coronado Oil and Gas Company, 285 U. S. 393,
52 Sup. Ct 443 (1932) certainty is impossible.
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It is not always clear whether the courts are basing their decisions
on the idea of immunity of instrumentalities of the United States or
on the theory that the property of the corporations is property of the
United States and therefore exempt from taxation. Some courts
speak in terms of McCulloch v. Maryland; others attempt to merge
the personalities of the corporations and the United States. Yet none
follow Thomson v. Union Pacific" or Railroad Co. v. Penniston.
The most recent basis for the contention that property of the PW
Housing Corporation is tax exempt, is the case of Clallam Co., Wash.,
v. United States,' arising on a bill by the United States to cancel
taxes levied by the state and county on land and other physical property of the United States Spruce Production Corporation. This
corporation was incorporated under the corporation laws of the
State of Washington pursuant to an Act of Congress authorizing the
creation of a corporation, with all but seven shares subscribed for by
the United States and with those seven shares held by the necessary
directors but controlled by the United States together with an assignment to the United States of all the dividends and property rights
therein. Lands and other property were transferred by the United
States to the Corporation in exchange for bonds of the Corporation.
In short, as the Court concluded:
"The Spruce Production Corporation was organized by the
United States as an instrumentality in carrying on the war, all
its property was conveyed to it or bought with money coming
from the United States and was used by it solely as means to that
end.... Whatever assets may be realized (on liquidation) will
go to the United States."'
Immunity was claimed by the United States under the decision and
reasoning of McCulloch v. Maryland. The state contended that, although the means of carrying on the United States Government may
not be taxed, taxation of the property of the Spruce Production
Corporation was not such taxation. Nevertheless, the Court flatly
refused to permit taxation of the property of such a governmental
agency, organized solely "for the convenience of the United States
to carry out its ends."
Another Spruce Production Corporation case,' cited with approval
'9 Wall. (U. S.) 579 (1869) (property tax upheld). This statement refers
to the cases dealing with the wartime corporations.
"i8 Wall. (U. S.) 5 (1873) ; cf. Van Brocklin v. Anderson, 117 U. S. 151, 6

Sup. Ct 67o (i886).
"Id. at 344, Sup. Ct. at 121.
'U. S. Spruce Production Corp. v. Lincoln Co., 285 Fed. 388 (D.Ore., 1922).

'263 U. S. 341, 44 Sup. Ct. 121 (1923).
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in the Clallam decision, found the tax on the property of the Corporation to be a tax on the means of government. The rationale of the
Court, however, was modified by its statement that, inasmuch as the
property of the Corporation had been purchased with government
funds appropriated for that purpose, it should be regarded as government property, or, as suggested by a New York court:
"property of a corporation, engaged in executing a federal
agency, is itself the means by which such agency is executed."'
Exemption from taxation has also been upheld on the theory that
such corporations are alter egos of the United States. In King Co.
Wash. v. United States Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corporation' (hereinafter called the Fleet Corporation) a similarly organized
corporation was involved. The Court denied the contention of the
taxing authorities that the power to tax existed where legal title was
in one other than the United States, saying:
"But here, admittedly, the property is not only held by a government agency, but was acquired with public funds, and was to
be used exclusively for public purposes.... To hold that it lost
its public character, because the government chose to have the
legal title in the name of a corporation, which it brought into
existence and completely controls for its own convenience, and
the entire capital stock of which it owns, would be to sacrifice
substance for form.""
But it must be noted that the property concerned in that case was
purchased, not out of funds obtained by the sale of stock to the United
States, but with moneys appropriated by Congress for that purpose
after the Corporation had been organized. This fact in itself explains
perhaps the Court's refusal to differentiate between legal and beneficial title. In a later case," also involving the Fleet Corporation,
the Court followed the King County procedure of determining taxability by the character of the owner of the beneficial title, over-ruling
the lower court's finding that taxability is determined by the character of the holder of the legal title. In United States v. Coghlan," the
Court expressly refused to inquire whether the Fleet Corporation.
was the United States, since as a governmental agency it was immune
2

" De La Vergne Mach. Co. v. State Tax Commission, 211 App. Div. 227, 231
68o, 684, (3rd Dept. 1925), aff'd 241 N. Y. 517, i5o N. E. 536
(,925).
"282 Fed. 950 (C. C. A. 9th, 1923).
"Id. at 953.
'U. S. S. B. E. Fleet Corp. v. Del. Co., Pa., 275 U. S. 483, 48 Sup. Ct. 21
(927).
"261 Fed. 425 (D. Md. i9i).
207 N. Y. Supp.
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from taxation regardless of its separate identity. Regardless of their
rationales, however, the federal courts have all upheld the non-taxability of the war time corporations.
It may be, too, that the Supreme Court will term housing a business and not a governmental function. In South Carolina v. United
States,' the United States Supreme Court distinguished between
functions strictly governmental in character and those termed
proprietory in nature. Burnet v. Coronado Oil and Gas Company"
was distinguished from South Carolinav. United States on this basis,
the court saying that Oklahoma in leasing her public lands for the
benefit of the public schools exercised a function strictly governmental
in character and:
"Consequently South Carolina v. United States much relied
upon, is not in point.""
In Indian Motorcycle Company v. United States," wherein a sales
tax upon motorcycles sold to the United States was held invalid, the
court again referred to South Carolinav. United States, saying:
"Of course, the reasons underlying the principle mark the
limits of its range. Thus, as to persons or corporations which
serve as agencies of government, national or state, and also have
private property or engage on their own account in business for
gain, it is well settled that the principle does not extend to their
private property or private business, but only to their operations
or acts as such agencies; and, in harmony with this view, it also
has been held where a State departs from her usual governmental functions and "engages in a business which is of a private
nature", no immunity arises in respect of her own or her agents'
operations in that business.' ' '
The wartime character of the Shipping and Housing Corporation of
1917 precludes any doubt that their activities were not proper governmental functions, but the status of housing by government in times of
peace is less certain.
A lower court in Pennsylvania7 attempted to distinguish between
general taxation and special assessments, suggesting that special
07199

U. S. 437, 26 Sup. Ct.

11o (I9O4).

'Supra note 56.
"Id. at 400, Sup. Ct at 443.
"283 U. S. 570, 51 Sup. Ct. 6or (1931).

"Id. at 576, Sup. Ct. at 6o3.
"City of Phila., v. U. S. Housing Corp., 82 Pa. Super. Ct. 343

(1923), aff'd
124 Ati. 669 (Pa. 1924) ; cf. Whittaker v. Deadwood, 23 S. D. 538, 122 N. W.

59o (i9o9)

(federal property exempt from special assessments).
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assessments are imposed for value conferred and imposing liability
on a quasi-contractual theory. As the lower Court said:
"We are dealing, not with general taxation, but with the right
of the city's contractor to collect from the land for the work and
labor furnished by him for the immediate benefit of the property.' 73
Apparently the Court was doubtful of the validity of its own argument for it proceeded in its opinion to discuss the question of title
being in a corporation and not in the United States, distinguishing
Faganv. City of Chicago' on that basis. On appeal, this finding was
confirmed with the added suggestion that lack of immunity was clearly indicated by the Act of Congress providing for the payment of
claims.
The Housing Corporation may also be confronted with the
requirement of paying franchise or qualification taxes, at least in
those states in which it is not incorporated but is doing business as
a foreign corporation. A tax upon the franchise or a tax for the
privilege of doing business within the state being a tax directly upon
the means of carrying on governmental functions, would seem clearly
invalid. Even those courts indicating that the taxation of property
may be permissible deny the power to tax the means.' There is
language in several United States Supreme Court opinions denying
the power of a state to impose franchise taxes. As early as 1877 the
United States Supreme Court in denying the power of the State of
Florida to grant the exclusive right of erecting telegraph lines to
state companies to the exclusion of foreign companies said:
"And undoubtedly a corporation of one state, employed in the
business of the general government, may do such business in
other states without obtaining a license from them." '
And again in 1888 in a dictum repeated in Pembina Mining Co. v.
Pennsylvania the Court said:
"The only limitation upon the power of the state to exclude a
foreign corporation from doing business within its limits, or
hiring offices for that purpose, or to exact conditions for allowing
the corporation to do business or hire offices there, arises where
the corporation is in the employ of the federal government, or
where its business is strictly commerce, interstate, or foreign."'
"Id. at 347.

184 Ill. 227 (1876).
"Supra notes 57 & 58.
"Pensacola T. & T. v. Western Union Tel. Co., 96 U. S. i, 12 (877).
17125 U. S. I81, I9O, 8 Sup. Ct. 737 (I888).
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And as the Court in De La Vergue Machine Co. v. State Tax Commission stated in refusing to impose a state tax based upon net income:
"If we regard the tax as being essentially a tax upon net income, it was a tax upon income accruing to the United States,
and consequently invalid as a tax upon federal property. The
same result follows if we regard it as a tax upon the privilege of
doing business or exercising a franchise."'
The United States Housing Corporation of 1917 qualified in twenty
states without the necessity of paying franchise taxes. As to the
necessity of paying recordation and filing fees in the state of incorporation there might be more doubt. The nominal amounts
generally required can hardly be regarded as a burden upon the
government. The recordation fees were waived by Delaware on incorporation of the Housing Corporation.
Inasmuch as the Housing Corporation proposes to dispose of the
completed structures and necessarily to receive mortgages for at least
a part of the purchase price, it is concerned with the taxability of
the property after sale and the priority of its lien over tax liens. The
United State Supreme Court has held that the interest of the United
States is paramount. In the language of the Court:
"We conclude that, although the City should not be enjoined
from collecting the taxes assessed to the purchasers by sales of
their interests in the lots, as equitable owners, it should be enjoined from selling the lots for the collection of such taxes unless
all rights, liens, and interest in the lots, retained and held by
the Corporation as security for the unpaid purchase moneys, are
expressly excluded from such sales, and they are made, by express terms, subject to all such prior rights, liens, and interests."'
Possibly a different decision would have been reached had not an
Act of Congress prohibited the conveyanceof the property "without
reserving a first lien .... for the unpaid purchase money". This
was indicated in Lincoln Co., Ore. v. Pacific Spruce Corporation,' a
"Supra note 62 at 231, N. Y. Supp. at 684.
"City of New Brunswick v. U. S., 276 U. S. 547, 556, 48 Sup. Ct. 371, 373
157 Atl. 13 (I93i);
cf. Baltimore Shipbuilding Co. v. Baltimore, 195 U. S. 375, Sup. Ct (,903)
(tax on property conveyed on condition subsequent).

(1928); City of Phila. v. Myers, io2 Pa. Super. Ct. 424,
'4o

STAT. 224 (,917).

F. (2d) 435 (C. C. A. 9th, i928). On the theory that no taxable interest
is present until a right to a conveyance of title exists the cases are perhaps
26
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case, in holding that where legal title was not to pass until full payment of the payment price, there was no taxable interest in the purchases.
The Report of the United States Housing Corporatione suggests
that exemption from taxation may mean loss of the facilities and
privileges and protection accorded taxpayers. The United States
Housing Corporation executed contracts with the municipalities, in
which its buildings were constructed, for the payment of an amount
equivalent to, taxes, in return for such privileges and protection.
Other "government buildings" have received such privileges as a
matter of courtesy. Whether police and fire protection, schooling
privileges, waste and sewage facilities may be denied a non-taxpayer
is problematical.
JURISDICTION

A possible means of securing tax exemption and immunity from
state and local regulation is the acquisition of exclusive jurisdiction.
Exclusive jurisdiction may be obtained by express cession of jurisExclusive jurisdiction may also be acquired
diction by the state.'
in accordance with Art. I Sec. 8 (17) of the United States Constitution reading:
"... and to exercise like Authority over all Places purchased
by the Consent of the Legislature of the State in which the Same
shall be, for the Erection of Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, dockyards, and other needful Buildings;"
State statutes usually provide for a general expression of consent
to the purchase of lands by the United 'States and blanket cession of
jurisdiction. A typical statute reads:
reconcilable. The question of the taxability of the purchaser's interest is not
here discussed.

Cf. Irwin v. Wright, 258 U. S. 219, 42 Sup. Ct. 293 (1922).

In connection with the taxability of leaseholds and income derived from leases
of Government property see Indian Territory Ill. Oil Co. v. Oklahoma, 24o
U. S. 522, 36 Sup. Ct. 453 (1916) ; Choctaw C. & G. Ry. v. Mackey, 256 U.
S. 531, 41 Sup. Ct. 582 (ig2i); Choctaw Oklahoma & Gulf Ry. v. Harrison,
235 U. S. 292, 35 Sup. Ct. 27 (1914); Susquehanna Power Company v. Tax
Commission, (No. I) 283 U. S. 291, 51: Sup. Ct. 432 (193o); (No. 2) 283
U. S. 297, 51 Sup. Ct. 434 (I93O) ; Gillespie v. Oklahoma, 257 U. S. 501, 42
Sup. Ct. I7I (1921); Burnet v. Coronado Oil and Gas Company, 285 U. S.
393, 52 Sup. Ct. 443 (932).
'REPORT OF THE U.

S. HOUSING CORPORATION

(1920).

'3Supra note 43. Both consent and cession of jurisdiction are not necessary.
U. S. v. French, 122 Fed. 518 (W. D. Ky. 19o3).
REPORT OF JUDGE ADVOCATE

GENERAL (1916)

MILITARY RESERVATIONS,
(new edition being compiled).
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569
Consent for United States to Acquire. Be it enacted by the People of the State of Illinois, represented in the General Assembly:
That the consent of the State of Illinois is hereby given, in accordance with the sixteen clause, eighth section, of the first
article of the Constitution of the United States, to the acquisition
by the United States, by purchase, condemnation or otherwise, of
any land in this state required for custom houses, court houses,
post offices, arsenals, or other public buildings whatever, or for
any other purpose of the Government.
Jurisdictionceded. That exclusive jurisdiction in and over any
land so acquired by the United States shall be, and the same is
hereby, ceded to the United States, for all purposes except the
administration "of the criminal laws and the service of all civil
processes of this state; but the jurisdiction so ceded shall continue no longer than the said United States shall own such
lands."
It has been argued that the "other needful Buildings" of the Constitution refers only to buildings eiusdem generis with those specifically
mentioned, i. e., "Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, dock-yards."" But
the term "other needful Buildings" has been construed to include
other types of government structures, such as post offices, customs
houses, canals, dams, soldiers' homes.' State statutes, too, have
extended the number of purposes for which exclusive jurisdiction may
be obtained. Such phrases as "other public buildings whatever," or
"any other government purposes" are common. Whether housing
comes within the context of "needful Buildings" is, perhaps, doubtful.
That it is a public purpose or purpose of the government within the
meaning of the state statutes of consent or cession of jurisdiction is
less doubtful.
Presumably purchase by the United States, where such a statute
of consent exists, vests exclusive jurisdiction in the United States
ipso facto. Where exclusive jurisdiction is ceded, acceptance of such
exclusive jurisdiction will be presumed on the theory that the United
States is benefited thereby and that benefits will always be accepted.
'ILL.REv. STATs. (i929) c. 143.
'Arlington Hotel Co. v. Fant, 278 U. S. 439, 49 Sup. Ct. 227 (1929); People
v. Mouse, 259 Pac. 762 (D. Calif. 1927) (Soldiers' Home), rev'd 203 Cal. 782,
265 Pac. 944 (1928), cert. den. 278 U. S. 614, 49 Sup. Ct. 19 (1928); Re Kelly,
71 Fed. 545 (C. C. E. D. Wis. 1895) ; Lieber, Cessions of Jurisdiction, 32 Am.
L. REv. 78 (1898); cf. Six Cos. v. DeVinney, 2F. Supp. 693 (0. Nev. 1933).
s60928) 37 YALE L. J. 796; (Note) 74 L. ed. 761, 762. Whether "purchase"
includes condemnation is problematical. See State v. Board of Commissions,
153 Ind. 302, 304, 54 N. E. 8og, 811 (1899); cf. Fort Leavenworth v. Lowe,
supra note 43; United States v. Beatty, 198 Fed. 284 (W. D. Va. 1912).
'Fort Leavenworth v. Lowe, supra note 43; People v. Mouse, supra note 83;
United States v€.
Wurtzburger, 276 Fed. 753 (D. Ore. 192).
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Whether a cession of jurisdiction may be rejected without an act of
Congress is problematical. Rejection by an agency appears dubious.
Consent of the state to a retrocession of jurisdiction by Congress, on
the other hand, has been held unnecessary.' A similar problem exists
in the case of acquisition of jurisdiction by purchase with state consent alone. Once the property has been resold to private individuals,
however, jurisdiction reverts to the state.
The further objection to the acquisition of exclusive jurisdiction
may be, and has been, raised that Art. I Sec. 8 (17) of the United
States Constitution and the State statutes of consent and cession of
jurisdiction apply only to lands and buildings held by the United
States in the name of the United States and not to lands and buildings whose "title" is technically in a corporation. It must be borne
in mind, too, that there is a difference in terminology between the
United States Constitution and the supplementary State statutes of
consent, and the State cession laws. The first makes no mention of
the word "title", the second specifically refers to "title" in the United
States. In an early Wisconsin case, In re O'Connor,' the objection
was raised and sustained that the United States Constitution is applicable only where purchase is by the United States as such and not
where title is held by a National Soldiers' Home, a corporation
created by an act of Congress, with officers including the President
of the United States, the Secretary of War, and the Chief Justice of
the United States Supreme Court. There was in existence a state
statute ceding jurisdiction, but the Court spoke in terms of Art. I
Sec. 8 (17) of the United States Constitution, i. e., purchase with the
consent of the state. The California Appellate Court upheld a similar
argument, involving the same Corporation, but that decision was
later reversed.'
The Corporation involved above differs materially in financial
and corporate structure from the Housing Corporation. Nevertheless, for many purposes, corporations organized tinder state laws for
federal purposes have been considered alter egos of the United States.
"Renner v. Bennett, 2. Ohio St. 431 (1871) ; ci. State v. Board of Commissions, smipra note 86; see Arlington Hotel Co. v. Fant, spra note 85, at 455,
Sup. Ct. at 231. Once the purpose has ceased, jurisdiction reverts in accordance
with the statutory provisions. Cf. Palmer v. Barrett, 162 U. S. 399, I6 Sup. Ct.
837 (i896). Jurisdiction would revert to the state, therefore, on sale by the
Housing Corporation.
"37 Wis. 379, ig Am. Rep. 765 (1875).

"People v. Mouse, supra note 85.
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In United States Grain Corporation v. Phillips," for example, the
whereabouts of legal "title" was expressly considered immaterial.
Exclusive jurisdiction so acquired might result in embarrassing
difficulties. Persons residing on the land might be deprived of civil
and political rights. In Massachusetts in an Opinion of the Justices"
it was said that residents of the Boston navy-yard were not entitled
to vote in town elections nor their children to take advantage of local
schooling benefits. In Sinks v. Reese' the inmates of a Soldier's
National Home were barred from voting. Again in Lowe v.Lowe"
residents of a federal reservation in Delaware were held not entitled
to sue for divorce in the state courts of Delaware. Presumably the
city in which the building is located might refuse to furnish police and
fire protection. Municipalities might deny the use of their water and
lighting plants. Other government buildings such as post offices and
customs houses supply their own police protection and receive fire
protection as a matter of courtesy. But antagonism to government
construction of housing might lead to a withdrawal of such facilities.
Before undertaking construction in any particular locality, therefore, the Housing Administration will require evidences of good
faith and cooperation from the local governments. The legal, or, at
least, moral obligation not to sabotage the projects by taxation, burdensome building regulations, or withdrawal of municipal facilities
will be a prerequisite to government construction. The social and
economic benefits that will result from the construction of housing
by the government is expected to obviate any antagonism.
THE

HOUSING

CoRPoRATION

As

AN ALTER EGO OF THE

UNITED' STATES

As already indicated the question of the similarity of identity of
the United States and of the Public Works Administration Housing
Corporation may be in issue in a number of situations, primarily
that of taxation, state regulation, jurisdiction. Cases involving the
interchangeability of the personalities of the United States and its
federal corporations and their subjectiofi to state laws or to duties
imposed upon business corporations have arisen frequently. There
is no definite line of demarcation. For some purposes the corporations
have been considered the United States; for other purposes the idea
U. S. xo6, 43 Sup. Ct. 283 (1922).
Mass. 580 (1841) ; 6 Op. of Att'y Gen. (U. S.) 577 (1854).
'i9Ohio St. 3o6 (1869).'
"Lowe v. Lowe; i5o Md. 592, 133 Ad. 729 (1926).
1261
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of a separate and distinct entity has been maintained. The so-called
war-time corporations, on the whole, were created under state laws
pursuant to an Act of Congress authorizing the creation of a
corporation by the President." At least two corporations, the United
States Grain Corporation and the Sugar Equalization Board, Inc.,
were organized under an act merely authorizing the President to
"create and use any agency" necessary to effectuate the purposes of
the act and not expressly authorizing the creation of a corporation.'
All the corporations were financed at first, at least, by a sale of stock
to the United States.
(a)

Immunity from suit

A case much cited by later federal cases and the precursor of a
horde of federal court decisions is Sloan Shipyards Corporation v.
United States Emergency Fleet Corporation"Z (hereafter called the
Fleet Corporation) involving three separate cases. The first case involved the right to sue the Fleet Corporation in the federal courts to
set aside a contract allegedly induced by duress and to have requisitioned properties restored. The second case was a similar proceeding for a breach of contract. The third case presented the question
of whether the Fleet Corporation was entitlea to priority in bankruptcy proceedings on a claim arising under a contract wherein it
was designated as "representing the United States." Although
recognizing the Fleet Corporation as a federal instrumentality, the
United States Supreme Court held the corporation subject to suit as
a private corporation. The Court said: "The fact that the corporation was formed under the general
laws of the District of Columbia is persuasive, even standing
alone, that it was expected to contract and to stand suit in its
own person, whatever indemnities might be furnished by the
United States."'
A large number of cases have since arisen attempting to distinguish
the case on various grounds, principally that (i) the Court construed the intention of Congress to be that the Fleet Corporation
shall be not immune from suit; (2) liability was imposed on the
Corporation on the theory that an agent committing a wrong is himself liable. As the court said:
"For a list of these corporations see United States v. McCarl, 275 U. S.I,

48 Sup. Ct 12 (927).
04o STAT. 276 (917).
m'258 U. S.549, 42 Sup. Ct. 386 (1922).
"Id. at 570, Sup. Ct. at 388.
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"These, provisions sufficiently indicate the enormous powers
ultimately given to the Fleet Corporation. They have suggested
the argument that it was so far put in place of the sovereign as
to share the immunity of the sovereign from suit otherwise
than as the sovereign allows. But such a notion is a very dangerous departure from one of the first principles of our system
of law. The sovereign properly so called is superior to suit for
reasons that often have been explained. But the general rule is
that any person within the jurisdiction always is amenable to the
law. If he is sued for conduct harmful to the plaintiff his only
shield is a constitutional rule of law that exonerates him. Supposing the powers of the Fleet Corporation to have been given
to a single man we doubt if any one would contend that the acts
of Congress and the delegations of authority from the President
left him any less liable than other grantees of the power of eminent domain to be called upon to defend himself in court. An
instrumentality of Government he might be and for the greatest
ends, but the agent, because he is agent, does not cease to be
answerable for his acts... The plaintiffs are not suing the United
States but the Fleet Corporation, and if its act was unlawful,
even if they might have sued the United States, they are not cut
off from a remedy against the agent that did the wrongful act.
In general the United States cannot be sued for a tort, but its
immunity does not extend to those that acted in its name. It is
not impossible that the Fleet Corporation purported to act under
the contract giving it the right to take possession in certain
events, but that the plaintiffs can show that the events had not
occurred. The District Judge gave weight to the phrase in the
general incorporation law of the District that corporations formed
under it shall be capable of suing and being sued in any Court in
the District. Code D. C. 607. But we do not read those words
as putting District corporations upon a different footing from
those formed under the laws of the states."'"
The fact that the contract was made by the Fleet Corporation
"representing the United States of America" however was regarded
as unimportant by the Court. In the later case of Fleet Corporation
v. Harwood,' the contract read, by the .Fleet Corporation "representing and acting. . . for and in behalf of the United States of America (hereinafter referred to as the owner)". Yet the Court held the
Fleet Corporation to be bound on the contract, saying that one acting
as a private agent may be bound, although the agency is known, if
he executes a contract in his own name, and refusing to accept the
presumption that a public agent is not bound as an individual since
no one is justified in believing that he meant to be bound.
"Id. at 566, Sup. Ct. at 388.

'0281 U. S. 519, 50 Sup. Ct. 372 (1930).
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The issue has arisen in a number of other factual and legal set-ups.
They may be readily classified as:
(b) "Real party in interest"
In a suit to compel the Fleet-Corporation to comply with an agreement to subordinate its mortgages to the plaintiff's mortgages, the
objection was raised that the United States was an indispensable
party to the suit." In an extensive opinion holding the Corporation
to be no different from an ordinary business corporation, the court
denied the contention. This was so despite the fact that the bonds
and mortgages described the Fleet Corporation as representing the
United States.
Other 'cases have held the United States to be the real party in
interest. In Erickson v. United States, the United States was held
a proper party plaintiff in a breach of contract action. In United
States v. Czarnikow-Rionde Co.,' the United States was also a proper
party plaintiff. But that case is distinguishable since the United
States owned the vessels involved and the Fleet Corporation quite
clearly acted as agent only. The Harwood and Providence Engineering Co. cases were differentiated on the ground that they were cases
of suit against the Fleet Corporation. And in Russell Wheel &
Foundry Co. v. United States," the United States was held to be the
proper party plaintiff, in an action to recover an over-payment made
under a contract executed by the Fleet Corporation, both at common
law and under a Michigan statute reading "every action shall be
prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest." But where a
surety bond was under seal and made out to the Fleet Corporation,
"representing the United States (hereinafter called the obligee)" only
the Fleet Corporation was permitted to sue on the bond."' The cases
are reconcilable once one regards the Fleet Corporation as the agent
of the United States and the United States as the real party in interest.
(c) Counterclaimand set-off
Analogous to the question of alter ego and "real party in interest"
is the question of whether the United States may counterclaim or
set-off claims owned by the Fleet Corporation.
'Providence Eng. Corp. v. Downey Shipbuilding Corp. 294 Fed. 641 (C.C.A.
2d, 1933).
"2264 U. S. 246, 44 Sup. Ct. 310 (1923).
'4o F. (2d) 214 (C.C.A. 2d, 193o), cert. den. 282 U. S. 844, 51 Sup. Ct. 24
(193o) ; U. S. v. Gano-Moore, 35 F. (2d) 395 (E.D. Pa. 1929) ; U. S. v. Brown,
2"3I F. (2d) 826 (C.C.A. 6th, 1929).
247 N.Y. 211, 13o N.E. 13 (1928).
'U. S. v. Amsterdam, 55 F. (2d) 277 (S.D. N.Y. 1932).
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The Court of claims has ruled that where the Fleet Corporation has
made a contract containing the language "representing and acting in
all respects to all matters . . . for and on behalf of the United States"
the United States may in a tax refund action counterclaim as principal
for damages arising out of such contract. In Crane z. United
States,' the Court said:
"It should especially be noted that in none of the cases cited on
behalf of the plaintiffs was the relation of the Fleet Corporation
(as agent) to the United States so expressly defined."'
The Court distinguished the Sloan case, the contract involved therein containing the language "representing the United States", on the
ground that the Supreme Court looked at the contract as brought
about by the unlawful act of the Fleet Corporation. In effect, however, the holding is merely that the principal may bring the action
himself. In an analogous situation, the United States and the Fleet
Corporation were not regarded as the same persons so that an actibn
against the United States did not toll the running of the Virginia
statute of limitations for wrongful deaths against the Fleet Corporation . '
(d) Employees and Agents as Employees and Agents of the
United States
A distinction has been made between the Fleet Corporation and the
United States in that employees of the Fleet Corporation have been
regarded as not being the employees of the United States. For example, in United States v. Strang,' an inspector of the Fleet Corporation was held not to be affected by the United States Criminal
Code Sec. 41 providing that no officer or member of a firm contracting with the United States shall be an agent of the United States, on
the ground that the Fleet Corporation was not the United States but
a separate entity, its inspectors being appointed not by the President
or Congress, but by the officers of the Fleet Corporation, and subject
to removal by the Fleet Corporation only. The Attorney-General
had ruled previously that a federal eight hour law applying to employees of the Federal Government did not include employees of a
railroad corporation organized in New York and operating in Panama,
most of whose stock was owned by the United States, a few shares
1055 F. (2d) 734 (Ct. Cl. 1932), cert. den. 287 U.S. 6oi, 53 Sup. Ct. 7 (1932).
'T Id. at 736.
'sLjdgren v. Fleet Corp. 55 F. (2d) 117 (C.C.A. 4th, 1932), cert. den. 286
U.S. 542, 52 Sup. Ct. 499 (933).
1254 U.S. 491, 41 Sup. Ct. 165 (1921).
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being privately owned, and the shares of each director being secured
to the United States by an option of purchase'
In Dalton v. United
Statest m a retiring officer of the United States Army, appointed a
trustee of the Fleet Corporation did not come within a Federal act
prohibiting the holding of two federal offices and the drawing of pay
in both capacities. But in United States Grain Corporation v.
Phillipst m the Supreme Court held that gold owned by the Corporation
and having its legal title in the name of the Corporation was nevertheless the property of the United States so that naval regulations giving
to a naval officer a fee for carrying gold did not apply. It was admitted by the Court that if the United States had had legal title to the
gold, there would have been no doubt whatever that the naval officer
was not entitled to a fee.
FOR

PURPOSE OF CRIMINAL STATUTES
m it
United States v. Walter,'

In
was held that a fraud against the
Fleet Corporation was a fraud against the United States under the
United States Criminal Code imposing liability on persons "defrauding the United States", inasmuch as pecuniary loss to the United
States would have resulted and the efficiency of a very important
instrumentality of the United States would have been impaired. This
holding was separate and apart from a holding in the same case to the
effect that United States Criminal Code Sec. 41, making it a crime
to present a fraudulent claim against "any corporation in which the
United States is a shareholder" was intended to apply to corporations
like the Fleet Corporation that are 'instrumentalities of the United
States and in which, for that reason, it owns stock.
The earlier case of Salas v. United States' involved a railroad
corporation whose entire stock was owned by the United States and
whose corporate set-up was used to avoid the restrictions of United
States laws regarding the Canal Commission. The court there held
that a fraud upon the corporation was not a fraud upon the United
States on the ground that the United States had abandoned its sovereign capacity. That corporation was not one originally organized by
the United States. Yet in both cases the United States was more than
a mere stockholder; it was the owner m
The Salas case was distinguished in Ballaine v. Alaska Ry.,m on
n'25
tm

Op. of Att'y

Gen. (U. S.) 465 (19o5).

n'7, Ct. Cl. 421 (1931).

Supra note 91.
"'263 U.S. 15, 44 Sup. Ct. 123 (1923).
"'234 Fed. 842 (C.C.A. 2d, 1916).
'mSee Bank of United States v. Planters' Bank, 9 Wheat. 905 (U.S. 1824).
"259 Fed. 193 (C.C.A. 9th, 1919).
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the ground that there the United States had ventured into a commercial enterprise whereas in this case all the stock and assets of the
railroad were purchased for public purposes. The court in Ballaine
v. R. R., therefore, permitted the railroad to claim the immunity of a
sovereign.
(e) Priority in Bankruptcy
The claim of the Fleet Corporation to priority as a creditor in
bankruptcy proceedings was denied by the Supreme Court in the third
Sloan case." Yet the denial of priority resulted in financial loss to
the United States. United States v. Crane, discussed above under
counterclaims, distinguished the case on the ground that the bill
against the trustee was brought in the name of the Fleet Corporation.
(f)

Priority In and Reduced Rates for
Telegraph Service

In Fleet Corp. v. Western Union Tel. Co.,' the Fleet Corporation
was held entitled to the lower rates given the United States. The
Court's theory was that although the Fleet Corporation was a private
corporation, all of its stock was owned by the United States; payment
of private rates would increase the charges upon the Treasury (the
original $5o,oooooo had long since been spent and appropriations
made directly); that there was no intention on the part of the
United States to deprive itself of the benefit of priority and lower
rates, unlike the intention to be subject to suit; that even though
it may be subject to suit as a private corporation, there is:
"no reason for denying that the Fleet Corporation is a Department of the United States within the Post Roads act."
In short, the Court found that the Fleet Corporation is entitled to the
government rates
"not because it is an instrument of the government, but because
it is a Department of the United States within the-meaning of the
Post Roads Act."'
National Banks and Federal Reserve Banks were distinguished as
being private corporations because of the presence of private capital.
The earlier case of Commercial Pac. Cable Co. v. Philippine
National Bank,' is distinguishable. Only 85% of the capital stock
was owned by the Philippine Government.
nlSupra note 97; W. Va. R.R. v. Jewett, 26 F. (2d) 503 (E.D. Kan. 1926).
11275 U.S. 415, 48 Sup. Ct. i98 (1928).
'"Id. at 426, Sup. Ct at 202.

'-1263 Fed. 218 (S.D. N.Y.

I92O).
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(g) Attachment or garnishment
A federal court has held that the Fleet Corporation may not be garnisheed for the wages of an employee of the Fleet Corporation on
the ground that although the Corporation may sue or be sued it cannot be subjected to garnishment in cases unrelated to its own duties
or liabilities.tm In Haines v. Lone Star Shipbuilding Co.,' however,
garnishment was permitted on the ground that though an arm of and
agent of the United States, the Fleet Corporation is subject to the liabilities of ordinary business corporations, there being nothing about
immunity in the Act of Congress authorizing its organization. These,
however, were cases of garnishment of sums due third parties. Under the ruling in Lake Monroe, the property of the corporation
presumably may be attached and sold for debts of the corporation
itself.
The financial structure of the Housing Corporation differs from
that of the Fleet Corporation. The latter corporation was financed
mainly by sales of stock to the United States; the Housing Corporation expects to obtain its funds by an appropriation and allotment
of Public Works moneys, to be disbursed by the Treasury. Less
possibility exists therefore of the courts, permitting a levy of execution against the funds of the Housing Corporation. That is, they
may be considered non-attachable funds of the United States.
In regard to the relation of the Fleet Corporation to the United
States, Justice Brandeis has said:
"At no time, during the War. or since its close, have the financial transactions of the Fleet Corporation passed through the
hands of the general accounting officers of the government or
been passed upon, as accounts of the United States, either by the
Comptroller of the Treasury or the Comptroller General. The accounts of the Fleet Corporation, like those of each of the other
corporations named, and like those of the Director General of
Railroads during federal control, have been audited, and the control over their financial transactions has been exercised, in accordance with commercial practice, by the board or the officer
charged with the responsibilities of administration. Indeed, an
important, if not the chief, reason for employing these incorporated agencies was to enable them to employ commercial
methods and to conduct their operations with a freedom supposed to be inconsistent with accountability to the treasury
under its established procedure of audit and control over the
'McCarthy v. Fleet Corp., 53 F. (2d) 923 (App. D.C. 1931).
Pa. 82, i1O At. 788 (1920).
'250 U.S. 246, 39 Sup. Ct. 480 (.1919) ; cf. Fleet Corporation v. Rosenberg,
276 U.S. 2o2, 48 Sup. Ct. 256 (1928) ; Johnson v. Fleet Corporation, 28o U.S.
320, 50 Sup. Ct. 118 (193o).
1226
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For the Fleet
financial transactions of the United States. . .
Corporation is an entity distinct from the United States and
from any of its departments or boards, and the audit and control of its financial transactions is, under the general rules of
law and the administrative practice, committed to its own
corporate officers, except so far as control may be exerted by the
Shipping Board."

*

*

*'

There is more basis for terming the Housing Corporation an alter
ego of the United States than in the case of the war time corporation.
Those corporations were financed mainly by sales of stock to the
United States. The Housing Corporation as now organized is to
derive its funds from a direct allotment by the Public Works Administrator.
It is difficult to ascertain a consistent rationale in these cases.
The war time corporations were not created to evade personal liability
of the United States. Suit against the United States in any event
would be unavailing without the consent of the United- States.
There is no reason, therefore, for imposing the duties and liabilities
assumed by business corporations in return for the privilege of limiting the liability of their shareholders. Congress authorized the creation of the corporations as a means of avoiding governmental delays
and for the sake of administrative convenience. Permeating all the
cases is the feeling, expressed by Justice Brandeis in United States
v. McCarl, that the chief reason for employing these incorporated
agencies was to give them the advantages of commercial methods and
a freedom supposed to be inconsistent with accountability to the
treasury. Whether or not Congress intended the concomitant detriments, however, the courts have in some instances imposed them.
CONCLUSION

These problems constitute the major difficulties and pitfalls of
the Public Works Emergency Housing Corporation. The increased
use of federal corporations inevitably will raise further issues not as
yet litigated in the courts. New bills are constantly being drafted,
resulting in corporate agencies such as the Reconstruction Finance
Corporation, the Tennessee Valley Authority and the Home Owners'
Loan Corporation. In the drafting of the acts establishing such organizations as these, some of the problems discussed above may be
obviated. Draftsmanship, however, is notoriously faulty, new legislation brings to light issues previously unknown, and the intention
of legislators is always a subject of controversy. The next few years
should give birth to a wealth of legal problems centering around the
activities of these and future governmental corporations.
"'Supranote 95.

